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5The Gains and Limitations of
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the Nonferrous Metal Mining Industry
Grupo México and the Indigenization of the Mining Industry
Grupo México Today
Grupo México is an indigenous enterprise group made up of a holding
company of the same name that controls numerous subsidiaries operating in
the nonferrous metal mining sector. Like the other industries examined in
this book, the mining industry has become oligopolized. In the 1996 Expansión
listing of the 500 largest enterprises, 11 companies in the mining sector (which
in this chapter excludes petroleum) are listed. But the top two companies
employ 74 per cent of the sector’s workforce and account for 81 per cent of
its total sales (Expansión, August 14, 1996). At the top of the list is Grupo
México; second is Industrias Peñoles which like Grupo México is a creation
of the government’s indigenization program.
The holding company Grupo México was set up in 1994. Before that the
group was under the control of the holding company Grupo Industrial Minera
México (Grupo IMMSA). When the new Grupo México holding company
was established, a multifaceted reorganization of this mining group took place.
One facet was that two large-scale copper mining companies, Mexicana de
Cobre and Cía. Minera de Cananea, which had been acquired by the group
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through the privatization of public enterprises and had been placed outside
the group organization, were integrated under an intermediate holding com-
pany which held business subsidiaries under its control. Another facet was
that foreign capital participation in the new organization was reduced to 26
per cent. Previously the holding company Grupo IMMSA had 100 per cent
indigenous capitalization, but a foreign-owned enterprise, Asarco (discussed
below), had continued to hold 34 per cent capital participation in the group’s
intermediate holding company even after indigenization. A third facet of re-
organization was that foreign participation in the new organization was
changed from the unlisted intermediate holding company to the listed hold-
ing company Grupo México. This move made it easier for Asarco to sell its
stockholdings on the stock exchange and withdraw from Mexico. This orga-
nizational restructuring brought about a radical change in the mining industry’s
relationship with foreign capital investment that continued after in-
digenization.
Until World War II the mining industry was Mexico’s main export indus-
try, but today it no longer holds such importance. In 1993 the industry made
up 1.0 per cent of the country’s GDP and accounted for only 2.2 per cent of
exports (INEGI 1995, pp. 7, 89). But while the figures for the mining indus-
try are small as a portion of the country’s GDP and exports, it has grown
more important as a supplier of raw materials to domestic industries as the
industrialization of Mexico’s economy has progressed. The main consump-
tion of nonferrous metals has been in industries like construction, machin-
ery, automobiles, and electric machines which have been at the center of
Mexico’s industrialization (INEGI 1986, pp. 16, 21, 23, 25, 27). Because its
role as a supplier of raw materials became so important for underpinning the
country’s industrialization, revitalizing the mining industry became a matter
of government policy, and in the early 1960s the government adopted
indigenization as the method for achieving this goal.
Decline of Mexico’s Mining Industry and Indigenization
The history of mining in Mexico goes back to the Spanish colonial period.
By 1600 Mexico had become one of the world’s major silver producers
(Bernstein 1964, p. 9), and it still is one today. But the important area of the
mining industry today is not silver but nonferrous metals, especially copper,
lead, and zinc which are mined primarily for industrial use. The formation of
the nonferrous mining industry goes back to the start of the twentieth century
when major U.S. mining enterprises undertook large-scale capital invest-
ments and a flourishing nonferrous metal mining and smelting industry arose.
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Within a short time the mining industry grew to become Mexico’s major
export industry. Most of the large-scale mining enterprises were foreign-
owned. In 1928, for example, 75 per cent of mine production was carried on
by American affiliates and another 20 per cent by British-owned enterprises,
and 85 per cent of the mines were owned by foreign companies. Most of the
ores and minerals extracted were exported with 60 per cent of the lead, 70
per cent of the silver, and 90 per cent of the copper going to the U.S. market
(Sariego and others 1988, p. 148).
After the Great Depression, Mexico’s mining industry began to stagnate,
and a downtrend set in after World War II. The causes were the imposition of
high taxes on foreign-owned companies and government policies to protect
workers which were manifestations of a rising Mexican nationalism. These
curbed foreign efforts to invest in mining, and over time existing mines be-
came exhausted as investment waned (Bernstein 1964, pp. 282–84). Mean-
while the country’s economy had started to industrialize, and the manufac-
turing sector rather than mining attracted foreign investment (Sariego and
others 1988, p. 160). Other than iron ore, coal, and sulfur mining which were
fostered through direct government support, the rest of the mining industry
remained stagnant, and its importance in the national economy continued to
decline. As a proportion of GDP, mining in 1930 accounted for 10 per cent;
this slid to 6 per cent in 1940, 3 per cent in 1950, and 2 per cent in 1960
(Sariego and others 1988, p. 165). As a proportion of total exports, in 1938 it
accounted for 36 per cent, in 1948 it was 28 per cent, and in 1953 23 per cent
(Bernstein 1964, p. 238). The proportion of government revenue it accounted
for was 28 per cent in 1939, 17 per cent in 1948, 8 per cent in 1955, and 4 per
cent in 1960 (Sariego and others 1988, p. 166).
The reorientation of the mining industry from primarily exporting miner-
als to supplying raw materials to the domestic market began during the 1950s.
During the 1940s and 1950s the production of copper, lead, and silver re-
mained at the same level or declined and exports continued to fall. However,
domestic consumption increased, especially for copper and lead, and there
was not enough production capacity to fully supply the needs of exports, so
these declined (Hoshino 1998, pp. 147–48). The increase in domestic con-
sumption was due to the growth of industries such as electric power genera-
tion, construction, machinery, automobiles, and electric machines which used
copper and lead. But even with the expansion of domestic demand, nonfer-
rous raw materials that had been exported could not suddenly be redirected
for use in domestic production because of the lack of domestic capacity for
smelting and refining these raw materials. Mexico began to set up these fa-
cilities in the 1950s.
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With the 1950s, the orientation of the mining industry began to shift more
toward supplying domestic consumption, but the industry had problems re-
sponding to the expanding demand. One reason was its stagnant level of
production. The main factor for this was that although existing mines were
becoming depleted and exhausted, no new exploring was taking place (Sariego
and others 1988, p. 175). Another problem was the insufficient capacity of
domestic smelting facilities. In the 1950s there was no electrolytic zinc pro-
duction being done in Mexico. Most of the country’s zinc was exported for
smelting. The reason for the mining industry’s overall stagnation was seen as
a lack of interest by foreign companies to invest in the industry. Therefore
indigenization was expected to be Mexico’s policy for extricating itself from
the yoke of foreign capital, overcoming the industry’s stagnation, and strength-
ening its ties with domestic industries. Three American companies, Asarco,
Anaconda, and Amax, dominated the nonferrous metal industry, and these
three companies became the target of indigenization.
Indigenization of the Big Three
Indigenization of the mining industry began following the enactment in
1961 of the “Regulatory Law of Article 27 of the Constitution regarding
Exploitation and Utilization of Mineral Resources” and the “Law on Tax and
Promotion of Mining.” Accompanying these were decrees issued by the Sec-
retary of Finance concerning production taxes and export duties. The essen-
tial points of the new mining law were: (1) mining concessions hereafter
were to be given only to Mexican nationals or to enterprises that had 66 per
cent or higher Mexican capitalization, and (2) existing concessions were to
expire in twenty-five years, and within that time period foreign-owned enter-
prises would have to sell 51 per cent or more of their shares to Mexican
nationals or Mexican-owned enterprises. Regarding the statutes on taxation,
the mining promotion law lowered income taxes on new investment by en-
terprises that successfully undertook indigenization (Behrman 1971, p. 62),
and the Secretary of Finance decrees reduced the industry’s production taxes
and export duties by 50 per cent (Wionczek 1967, p. 246).
The indigenization of Asarco will be discussed in the next section. The
remainder of this section will look at that for Amax and Anaconda. Amax
carried out its indigenization in 1961. Its two subsidiaries were merged to
form Metalúrgica Mexicana de Peñoles and 51 per cent of the shares were
sold off. In 1965 Amax sold the remainder of its shares and withdrew from
Mexico. The buyer was the enterprise group Grupo Cremi led by Raúl
Bailleres (Sariego and others 1988, pp. 253–54). One of the subsidiaries of
INDIGENIZATION POLICY 81
this group is the beer producer Moctezuma, which appeared in Chapter 2 of
this book. In 1969 the company’s name was changed to Industrias Peñoles
by which it is still known today (RPPCDF, C-3-739-39-37).
Anaconda’s subsidiary Cananea was indigenized in 1971. Of the 51 per
cent of the shares sold, 13 per cent each were purchased by the government’s
mining industry promotion committee (CFM) and by the government de-
velopment bank, NAFIN; 5 per cent each were purchased by Cobre de México,
a smelting company set up jointly by NAFIN and Anaconda, and by Banamex,
a private Mexican-owned bank; and 3 per cent were bought up by Cananea
employees. The remainder of the shares were offered to the public. The rea-
son Anaconda was slow to become indigenized is because it was difficult to
find buyers who could procure the huge sums of capital needed to make the
purchases. Because private entrepreneurs were finding it financially difficult
to make the purchases, the government stepped in, and thereafter govern-
ment stock purchases swelled. In 1985 the CFM owned 7.7 per cent and
NAFIN 50.7 per cent, a total of 58.4 per cent;1 in 1988 it reached 97 per cent
(El Financiero, March 14, 1988).
Indigenization of Minera Asarco and Its Business Development
Thereafter
Minera Asarco’s Indigenization
Asarco’s subsidiary Cía. Minera Asarco became indigenized in 1965. That
same year the company name was changed to Asarco Mexicana. It then be-
gan an increase in its capitalization, and the structure of its stock issue was
divided into 51 per cent A shares which only Mexican nationals could own,
and 49 per cent B shares which had no limitations on ownership. With this
the A shares were offered for sale. In 1974 the company was renamed Indus-
trial Minera México (IMMSA), and the ratio for A shares was raised to 66
per cent which brought it in line with the law regulating the extraction and
usage of mineral resources.
The 51 per cent of IMMSA’s A shares was acquired by Bruno Pagliai, an
Italian immigrant who served as chairman of the new company’s board of
directors until 1967 (RPPCDF, C-3-604-451-482). Pagliai was a close friend
of the former president of Mexico, Miguel Alemán (Brandenburg 1964, pp.
102, 220, 344), and he also played a role in promoting the establishment of
TAMSA which appeared in Chapter 3. Pagliai was succeeded as board chair-
man by Jorge Larrea, whose work had been in the construction industry and
who, like Alemán, was from the state of Veracruz. In coming over to the
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mining industry, Larrea is said to have thought he could make good use of his
business experience in mining which would help diversify his business.2 Af-
ter 1967 Larrea held the majority of shares in Asarco Mexicana (RPPCDF,
Folio Mercantil, no. 13540; C-3-666-256-221), but there were many other
entrepreneurs who purchased shares in the new company. An examination of
the name list of the board of directors points out two features about the in-
vestors. One is that they can be divided between those who were investors
from the start of indigenization and those who became investors after it took
place. The increase in the number of directors in the years the company raised
the level of its capitalization indicates that the group was bringing in new
investors as it expanded the scale of its business. The second feature is that
all of the investors were influential businessmen. This becomes evident when
noting what members of the company’s board of directors were also mem-
bers of the Mexican Council of Businessmen, which had been set up in 1962
and was composed of thirty prominent businessmen chosen from Mexico’s
business world. Of the nineteen people who had been on the board of direc-
tors of Asarco Mexicana (IMMSA after 1974) between 1965 and 1982 and
who represented A shares, ten had also been members of the Mexican Coun-
cil of Businessmen from its start in 1962. One member of the board of direc-
tors who went back to the start of indigenization was Juan Sánchez Navarro,
president of the beer producer Modelo that appeared in Chapter 2. Another
such member was Antonio Ruiz Galindo Jr. who headed the board of direc-
tors of the Desc group which will be analyzed in the next chapter. The above
facts suggest that only an extremely limited number of people had the requi-
site qualifications for participating in Asarco’s indigenization. The first quali-
fication was strong financial background. Only an extremely small number
of influential entrepreneurs at the top of Mexico’s business world were able
to procure the huge amount of funds for purchasing stock. The second quali-
fication was close government connections. A study that examined Mexico’s
major capitalists pointed to the existence of a Pagliai group which Alemán
and Larrea belonged to, and this group used its close connections with gov-
ernment to expand its members’ businesses (Fragoso and others 1979, pp.
140, 200).
Business Developments after Indigenization
1.  Expansion of production facilities and growth of output
In 1965 at the time it was indigenized, Asarco Mexicana’s major facilities
consisted of eight nonferrous metal mines, a copper smelter, lead smelter,
lead refinery, zinc refinery (distillation retort plant), a coal mine, a coke oven,
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and two sulfuric acid plants. By 1983 the number of nonferrous metal mines
had grown to ten, including mines under development, and the group had
added a fluorite mine. An electrolytic zinc refining plant had been set up
which made possible the integrated processing of zinc from the ore extrac-
tion to the refining stage. The number of coal mines had increased to five,
including those under development. The group was able to refine by-prod-
ucts such as fluoric acid and cadmium, and the capacity of its original mines,
beneficiation plants, and copper smelter had been expanded. In addition it
had invested in undertakings outside of the group. The most important was
Mexicana de Cobre, a joint venture with the government to develop the La
Caridad copper mine. As of 1971 the group had put up 49 per cent of the
capital invested in this venture. This was reduced to 15 per cent in 1983, but
after that under the government’s privatization program, the group acquired
the government’s shares, and Mexicana de Cobre became an affiliate of the
group. Another outside undertaking was the acquisition of 51 per cent of the
shares in Minera La Loteria in 1965 and the redevelopment of the mines
owned by that company (Hoshino 1998, pp. 156–57). In parallel with the
expansion of its facilities, Asarco Mexicana also increased its exploration
work, and estimates of the mineral deposits of its affiliated mines, which
stood at 11 million tons in 1965, rose to 27 million tons in 1971, then 58
million tons in 1978, and reached 82 million tons in 1983 (Asarco Mexicana
c1966, p. 12; c1972, p. 15; IMMSA 1984, p. 8).
Table 5-1 shows the volume of ore extracted from Asarco Mexicana’s (re-
named IMMSA in 1974) mines and the volume of minerals converted from
the ore by the group’s beneficiation plants. From the table it can be seen that
the volume of ore mined grew nearly three times between 1965 and 1984
which could be attributed to the increase in exploration, the development of
new mines, and the expansion of existing mines and beneficiation plants.
The increase in silver, zinc, and copper was particularly great. However, when
comparing the volume of ore mined and the volume of metals converted, the
former increased nearly threefold while the latter only about doubled. Also
at the same time that the group was developing new mines, it closed a num-
ber of existing mines (IMMSA 1984, p. 10; 1985, p. 11). This suggests some
downgrading and downscaling of ore deposits.
The output of the group’s smelters and refineries is shown in Table 5-2.
The biggest change can be seen in the production of refined zinc which in
1983 was nearly double that of the several preceding years. But the increase
in 1984 was not particularly significant indicating that production had not
yet reached full scale (IMMSA 1985, p. 12). There was also an increase in
the output of silver and blister copper, the latter attributable to the installa-
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tion of a new converter. When comparing the output of gold, silver, copper,
and lead coming from the mines and beneficiation plants to that from the
smelters and refineries, the output of the latter greatly exceeded that of the
former, meaning the latter had excess capacity. To make use of this excess
capacity, IMMSA undertook custom smelting and refining. The situation for
zinc was the opposite. The output of the mines and beneficiation plants greatly
exceeded that of the refineries, meaning that refining capacity was insuffi-
cient and there was an urgent need to build zinc refineries and put them quickly
into operation. The output of coal remained largely at the same level while
that for coke and other by-products declined. From 1971 development was
started on four coal mines, but in 1984 one of these was closed down (IMMSA
1985, p. 12). Thus IMMSA’s investment in the coal and coke sector did not
produce much result.
TABLE 5-1
VOLUME OF OUTPUT FROM MINES AND BENEFICIATION PLANTS OWNED BY
ASARCO MEXICANA (AFTER 1974 IMMSA), 1961–84
Volume of Metals Converted
Lead Copper  Zinc Fluorite
(1,000 (1,000  (1,000 (1,000
            Tons)       Tons)       Tons)  Tons)
1961 1,804 513 223 52 8 114
1962 1,831 527 214 47 8 101
1963 1,894 707 227 49 8 107
1964 1,863 665 232 46 9 98
1965 1,773 700 225 45 9 97
1967 1,729 506 222 46 8 95
1968 1,809 812 220 43 8 92       6
1969 1,943 560 219 51 8 108 37
1970 2,051 594 222 50 9 114 43
1971 2,610 319 217 49 15 116 55
1979 4,034 483 329 47 17 135 67
1980 4,199 395 339 52 16 139 65
1981 4,081 374 330 50 14 123 60
1982 4,426 403 387 56 16 150 37
1983 4,422 333 408 54 14 149 48
1984 4,935 351 440 67 17 157 52
Sources: Asarco Mexicana (c1966, c1972); IMMSA (1984, 1985).
Volume
Mined
(1,000
Tons)
Year Gold
(Kg)
Silver
(Kg)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2.  Financing
This section will look at the ways that financing was procured for the
expansion and construction of production facilities. Looking first at capital
increases, Asarco Mexicana (IMMSA after 1974) increased its capital from
300 million pesos at the time the company was indigenized in 1965 to 400
million pesos in 1967, then 600 million pesos in 1973, 800 million pesos in
1975, 840 million pesos in 1976, 1 billion pesos in 1977, and 1.2 billion
pesos in 1978 (RPPCDF, C-3-604-451-482, C-3-667-412-357, C-3-879-413-
444, C-3-1023-94-110, C-3-1036-439-444, C-3-1072-195-262). In 1978 the
stocks of IMMSA were transferred to the holding company Grupo IMMSA.
Grupo IMMSA’s capital then increased rapidly from 620 million pesos in
1978, to 900 million pesos  in 1979, then 2.3 billion pesos in 1981 (RPPCDF,
Folio Mercantil, no. 13540). Part of the increase in capital (such as in 1978)
included capital from retained earnings, but the increase in the number of
new directors in the years of capital increase indicates that funding was com-
TABLE 5-2
VOLUME OF OUTPUT FROM SMELTERS AND REFINERIES OWNED BY
ASARCO MEXICANA (AFTER 1974 IMMSA), 1961—84
       Volume of Metals Converted
Blister Refined Zinc
Copper Zinc Dust
(1,000 (1,000 (1,000
 Tons)  Tons)  Tons)
1961 1,538 393 93 23 52
1962 1,627 363 72 23 56
1963 1,564 382 75 21 57
1964 1,788 416 72 21 59
1965 2,068 474 74 20 59
1967 1,733 514 71 18 57 20
1968 2,264 593 69 22 59 17
1969 2,207 520 75 23 59 18
1970 2,683 542 76 25 60 19
1971 1,799 467 67 23 59 15
1979 1,782 617 80 36 48 7
1980 1,740 599 78 35 40 8
1981 1,645 577 70 31 41 9
1982 1,684 565 59 30 37 10
1983 2,015 670 64 33 77 7
1984 1,423 631 62 35 82 9
Source: Same as for Table 5-1.
Year
Gold
(Kg)
Silver
(Kg)
Lead
(1,000
Tons)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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ing in from new stockholders. However, this funding was totally inadequate
to meet the huge demand for funds, and this can be seen from the continual
downtrend in Asarco Mexicana’s capital-to-assets ratio (Asarco Mexicana
c1966, p. 17; c1972, p. 29).
Because of the enormous need for investment funds, loans from overseas
financial organizations became the major source for funds. Asarco Mexicana’s
ratio of total liabilities to net worth rose from 31.8 per cent in 1964, to 53.6
per cent in 1965, then to 58.2 per cent in 1970, and 90.0 per cent in 1971. The
sudden increase from 1964 to 1965 was due to the dollar-denominated loans
that were borrowed to purchase 51 per cent of the shares in Minera La Loteria;
the sudden increase between 1970 and 1971 came from the large loans bor-
rowed from four big private U.S. banks (Asarco Mexicana c1972, p. 33).
The details about borrowing in 1972 and after are unavailable, but in 1983
the ratio of total liabilities to net worth for the holding company Grupo IMMSA
stood at 106.4 per cent. After an assets reassessment in 1984, this dropped to
77.7 per cent, but the group’s foreign debt still stood at 191.6 million dollars
(IMMSA 1985, p. 21).
To summarize the points of this section—it was the introduction of the
government’s indigenization policy that allowed Asarco Mexicana (later re-
named IMMSA, then transferred to the holding company Grupo IMMSA
which was renamed Grupo México in 1994) to successfully break out of the
long decline that had gripped the mining industry. Following indigenization
new management came in which revived aggressive investment, and this led
to the expansion of production which put the group onto the path of growth.
However, to finance the enormous cost of this investment, the group built up
a huge foreign debt. But considering the limits on the financial resources of
Mexico’s entrepreneurs and the enormous amounts of money needed to de-
velop the mining industry, the huge growth of foreign borrowing was to some
extent inevitable. Grupo México was not alone. The rapid increase of foreign
borrowing became a phenomenon common to many large-scale Mexican
enterprises during the latter half of the 1970s. But unlike many of these en-
terprises that got caught up in the debt crisis in the 1980s when the peso
was devalued, Grupo México was only slightly affected because a large part
of its sales came from exports. The next section will examine how the above
developments for the largest mining group in the country affected the course
of the mining industry as a whole.
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Grupo México and the Gains of Indigenization in the Mining
Industry
To understand the gains of indigenization, we will first look at Mexico’s
production and export of silver, copper, lead, and zinc at the start of in-
digenization. Until the mid-1960s the output of all these minerals remained
flat or was falling, and exports of all were steadily declining, meaning that
the trends before indigenization continued to prevail. Some changes began
to appear during the latter half of the 1960s. One was the upward shift in the
output and export of zinc and in the output of copper. Another one was the
nearly complete loss of the industry’s capacity to export copper. As of 1970
the situation for the output and export of the above four minerals by process-
ing level of final products can be summed up as follows. There was no more
capacity to export copper, and most of the copper ore mined was refined and
consumed domestically. About 30 per cent of the zinc ore mined could be
refined domestically, and most of the ore was exported at the concentrate
stage. Nearly half of the silver and lead produced was exported, and most of
the ore for these two minerals was refined domestically. Thus the issues the
mining industry needed to deal with were firstly the need to increase the
production of copper by expanding mine output as well as smelting and re-
fining capacity to handle greater mine output; it was urgent for the industry
to satisfy the growing domestic demand for copper before dealing with ex-
port capacity. Next was the need to expand zinc refining capacity which would
make it possible to raise the value added on exports. For silver and lead the
need was to reverse the long-term downtrend of these minerals by expanding
mine output and the capacity of smelters and refineries to handle the greater
mine output. The remainder of this section will look at the extent that the
industry dealt with these issues during the 1970s.
The biggest increase in output took place in copper. Figure 5-1 shows that
mine output doubled from 1970 to 1979, and it continued to expand strongly
thereafter. This rapid expansion of output was primarily the work of Cananea
and Mexicana de Cobre. The output of blister and electrolytic copper was
slow to start, but by 1979 both were expanding in parallel with mine output.
But output could not keep up with domestic consumption, and from 1978 on
domestic consumption was greater than electrolytic copper output, meaning
that the difference had to be met by imports. Meanwhile in 1978 the output
of blister copper fell below that of electrolytic copper, meaning that an insuf-
ficiency of smelting capacity had arisen and blister copper had to be im-
ported. With the start of the 1980s, mine output leaped, and smelting and
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refining capacity was left far behind, which meant that the export of concen-
trate increased. The above facts indicate that copper output was enough to
satisfy domestic demand and to allow for exports to earn foreign exchange,
but there was an urgent need to expand smelting and refining capacity. This
expansion began to take place around 1980 with Cananea, Mexicana de Cobre,
and Cobre de México, a copper refining company, expanding their smelters
and refineries and building new capacity. Grupo México participated in the
expansion as well by installing a new converter. But output from all this new
investment did not begin to take effect until 1983. Cananea and Mexicana de
Cobre had to rely on foreign borrowing for the large amount of capital needed
to expand their facilities and build new capacity, and both were caught up in
the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s. NAFIN provided debt relief for both
companies by increasing its shareholdings in both. Later under the
Fig. 5-1.  Output of Copper by Type and Domestic Consumption, 1970–82
Sources: SIC (1971, pp. 7, 23); Minera Camimex (July–August 1978,
p. 11; May–June 1980, p. 7; May–July 1981, no. 3, p. 7; May–June
1982, p. 7; July–August 1983, p. 7); INEGI (1985, vol. 1, p. 441).
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government’s privatization policy these two companies were passed over to
Grupo México.
The expansion of zinc refining capacity was also carried out. Figure 5-2
indicates that the output of metallic zinc increased from 1970 to 1977. This
was due to the start of zinc refining by Peñoles. In 1982 Grupo México be-
gan operation of an electrolytic refinery, but the impact of this investment
lies outside the time frame of Figure 5-2.
In silver production the long period of declining output finally came to an
end during the second half of the 1970s. Most of the production of silver was
as a by-product of the smelting and refining processes for producing copper,
lead, and zinc, and the increase in the processing of these metals naturally
led to an increase in the production of silver. The mining of lead continued to
lag, but smelting and refining capacity expanded. The result was an insuffi-
cient supply of concentrate, and from 1977 imports made up for the short-
age. The issue of expanding the output of lead mines remained to be dealt
with (Hoshino 1998, pp. 147, 169).
From the above analysis it is evident that the mining industry after
Fig. 5-2.  Output of Zinc by Type and Domestic Consumption, 1970–82
Sources: SIC (1971, pp. 9, 25); Minera Camimex (May–June 1982, p. 18; May–
June 1983, pp. 18, 20; July–August 1983, p. 18); INEGI (1985, vol. 1, p. 443).
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indigenization succeeded in raising production capacity even though it was
troubled by a large accumulation of foreign debts and by capacity imbal-
ances among mining and metallurgic sectors. These imbalances derived from
the high uncertainty that is inherent in the mining industry because investing
in mines compared with investing in smelting and refining depends more on
the prevailing conditions of natural resources. Moreover, the uncertainty is
heightened by the worsening of the conditions where natural resources are
located. But even while burdened by such problems, the expansion of invest-
ment by the mining industry following indigenization brought about a rapid
expansion in copper mining, an expansion in copper and lead smelting and
refining capacity, an expansion in zinc refining capacity, and an increase in
the production of silver which was the result of the expanded capacity to
process the other metals. And Grupo México performed an important part in
the revitalization of the mining industry through its energetic exploration for
minerals and development of new mines, its expansion of smelting facilities
and construction of new refineries, and its capital investment in Mexicana de
Cobre.
Concluding Remarks: Conditions for the Success of
the Indigenization Policy
Following implementation of indigenization, the development of the nonfer-
rous mining industry benefited the national economy in three ways: it strength-
ened the system for supplying raw materials that supported industrialization;
it expanded export capacity which enhanced the acquisition of foreign ex-
change; and it improved the domestic processing of nonferrous metals that
were exported. In this sense Mexico’s indigenization policy was successful.
I would now like to point out conditions which made its success possible.
To begin with, the conditions in the mining industry were conducive for
the success of indigenization. Generally in the early stages of mining devel-
opment, the balance of negotiating power between foreign investors and the
government of the host country is tipped in favor of the former. But after
investment in development has been completed, the balance quickly shifts
toward the latter (Shafer 1983, pp. 97–98) because after the development
stage, it is no longer possible for assets to flee overseas which is the strong
bargaining chip that foreign investors can use in negotiations. However, even
if indigenization is carried out and ownership and management rights are
transferred, that does not mean that business operations will automatically
achieve self-reliance. For newly indigenized enterprises to survive and de-
velop, they have to secure markets, technology, and investment funds; and
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being able to inherit the business network that existed before indigenization
or having to build up a new network becomes an important issue for these
enterprises. Mexico was able to indigenize its mining industry without run-
ning into any major difficulties, and this can be attributed to the following
three factors: (1) industrialization of the economy had been steadily pro-
gressing, and when indigenization took place, almost a half of nonferrous
metal output was being absorbed by the domestic market; (2) starting in the
1960s developing countries began indigenizing their nonferrous mines, and
the major foreign mining companies which until then had held overwhelm-
ing control over the industry saw their power in the world market substan-
tially reduced; and (3) Mexico’s indigenization program did not require the
100 per cent transfer of ownership rights, only 51 per cent transfer which
allowed indigenized enterprises to gradually build up their self-reliance.
Factor no. 1 meant that Mexico’s mining industry had a secure domestic
market which lessened concern about the issue of market problems after
indigenization. Also ironically Mexico was fortunate in that its deposits of
natural resources were only of moderate size as this reduced the formidable
burden of establishing a marketing network in the world market.
Factor no. 2 was the upsurge of nationalism over natural resources which
gave impetus to movements throughout the world for indigenization. Along
with indigenizing their natural resource industries (and in many cases na-
tionalizing them), developing countries with oil and nonferrous metal re-
sources also gathered together to form organization of producer countries for
the purpose of reconciliating production, exports, and taxes among them
(Kuroko 1989, pp. 82–86). These movements to take control of their own
natural resources dealt a serious blow to the major foreign oil companies and
nonferrous enterprises that had long reigned over the world’s natural resource
industries. Most of the major enterprises in the nonferrous metal sector had
integrated production systems that ran from the ore extraction stage up to the
metal processing stage. The mining and beneficiation stages were carried out
in the developing countries outputting the raw materials while the latter-stage
smelting and refining processes were done in the developed home country
(although in some cases this latter processing stage was done in the develop-
ing country). Indigenization cut this integrated production system in two,
and with the development of smelting and refining capacity in the resource-
owning countries, the latter-stage processing facilities in the home country
were cut off from their long-standing sources that had supplied raw materi-
als. The integrated production systems of the major enterprises broke down
which quickly brought an end to their long domination of the market. There-
after these enterprises suffered takeovers by major oil companies, rational-
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ization, and severe anti-pollution controls on smelting and refining plants
because of rising concern about environmental problems. These aggressive
changes ultimately led to the breakup and/or restructuring of the major enter-
prises in the nonferrous metal mining sector.
Looking specifically at the outcome of the three big nonferrous metal pro-
ducers that were indigenized in Mexico, Anaconda was bought up by a major
oil company and then liquidated. Amax, which originally was a producer of
copper and molybdenum, diversified during the 1960s and 1970s, then went
through a process of rationalization in the 1980s, and was reorganized into a
producer of aluminum, coal, and gold. Asarco, which successfully devel-
oped into a custom smelting and refining company, originally did not have
much investment overseas, and it was not greatly affected by indigenization.
But then smelting and refining began to take place in the resource-owning
countries, so the company bought up mines in the United States, and today it
is developing an integrated production system in that country (Metal Mining
Agency of Japan 1989). Such liquidations and restructuring of major nonfer-
rous enterprises substantially diminished the portion of the world nonferrous
market where these enterprises had controlled prices and distribution, and
this led to an expansion of the competitive market. This opened the market
wider for resource-owning developing countries, but it also increased the
number of participants in the market which made competition more severe
and price fluctuations more extreme. And the risks of this newly widened
competitive market had to be borne by the resource-owning countries them-
selves. The global restructuring of the nonferrous market was also reflected
in the changes that took place in the distribution of Mexico’s exports. Up
until indigenization the country’s exports of nonferrous metals had gone en-
tirely to the United States (Bernstein 1964, p. 240), but after indigenization
its export market greatly diversified (Hoshino 1998, p. 174).
Turning to factor no. 3, the requirement for 51 per cent Mexican owner-
ship—by setting this criterion, Mexico was able to avoid the friction with
parent companies of Mexican subsidiaries that would have arisen had 100
per cent transfer been required. Keeping parent companies as stockholders
made it easier to gain their cooperation in securing markets and technology
even after indigenization. In the case of Grupo México, initially after
indigenization it carried on exporting through Asarco (Asarco Mexicana
c1966, p. 9), but by 1983 at the latest it had set up a sales subsidiary in the
United States and established its own marketing network. At the same time
the group reduced the ratio of its exports going to the U.S. market to 38 per
cent (IMMSA 1984, p. 14). In the area of technology as well, the group ini-
tially depended on Asarco for technological assistance, but in 1985 this de-
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pendence came to an end.3 In this way Grupo México made use of its rela-
tionship with Asarco in the areas of marketing and technology to gradually
build up its own capabilities in these areas, and this enabled the group to
evolve smoothly into a self-reliant business concern. Regarding financing
(which could not be expected from Asarco even before indigenization), this
was sought from foreign private banks, and the smooth implementation of
indigenization, the existence of Asarco as a stockholder in Grupo México,
and the steady progress of Mexico’s industrialization all worked advanta-
geously for acquiring financing from overseas. Also the rise of oil money in
the international financial market in the 1970s and the need to recycle this
money made it easy for Mexican enterprises to secure financing. The rise of
oil money itself had its origins in the upsurge of nationalism in the develop-
ing countries which had taken control of natural resources out of foreign
hands. Thus the current of the times provided an underlying impetus for
indigenization of Mexico’s mining industry.
Notes
1 Calculated from the name list of attendees at the regular meeting for Cananea
stockholders held on April 30, 1985.
2 According to an interview this author had at Grupo IMMSA on September 12,
1985.
3 Author’s interview at Grupo IMMSA on September 12, 1985.
